Are Delaware Corporations "Rolling Down Hill, Like A Snowball Headed For . . ."?

For Delaware, are the good times really over for good? 

University of Virginia School of Law Professor Michal Barzuza fears that they might be in a recently posted a draft of her upcoming article entitled "Nevada v. Delaware: The New Market for Corporate Law".    Professor Barzuza analyzes Nevada corporate law, finding that it "poses insurmountable obstacles to shareholder litigation that function to diminish important pillars of Delaware corporate law".  She also considers Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster's recent ruling in Palkon v. Maffeii, 2024 WL 678204 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2024) and its implications.  Finally, she argues that increasing competition from Nevada and Texas could put pressure on Delaware to relax its own corporate law and that Nevada's protection of directors and officers could lessen the significance and importance of Delaware's judiciary. 

Some might argue that Professor Barzuza's concerns about the deleterious effects of competition are at odds with basic economic theory which holds that increased competition yields increased innovation, improved quality and lower costs.   Viewed in this light, Delaware's erection of barriers to emigration are anticompetitive attempts by a near monopolist to preserve its dominance in the public corporation market.